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RANDOM URINALYSIS AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: CAN
THEY COEXIST?
To eradicate the widespread use of drugs in the workplace,' many
government entities2 have followed private employers3 by instituting
drug testing programs. Government has a valid interest in ensuring a
drug-free work force, particularly when impaired employees endanger
public safety.4 Yet the intrusive nature of mandatory urinalysis5 of
1. Bensinger, Drugs in the Workplace: A Commentary, 3 Behavioral Sciences and
the Law 441 (Autumn 1985). An estimated twenty-two million Americans use mari-
juana, four million people abuse cocaine, and ten million abuse prescription drugs. Id.
National surveys estimate that drug abusers will have three to four times more accidents
on the job compared with drug-free employees. Id. at 442. According to the National
Triangle Research Institute survey of 1982 documents, due to alcohol and drug abuse
employers lose 100 billion dollars every year in the form of reduced productivity and
expenses from treatment, law enforcement, accidents, and health care. Id.
2. Some governmental entities requiring employee drug testing include city police
departments, school teachers, firefighters and the U.S. Army. See, e.g., National Feder-
ation of Federal Empl. v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986) (the United
States Army); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. App. 1985) (police
departments); Matter of Patchogue - Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
55 UL.L.W. 2213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (school teachers); and Capua v. City of Plain-
field, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (firefighters).
3. Approximately twenty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies require job appli-
cants or current employees suspected of drug use to undergo drug testing. Omestad,
Drug Tests at 3M Plant Yield Constitutional Debate, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, pt. II,
at 6, col. 1 (1985 survey). Other private employers with drug testing programs include
International Business Machines (IBM), N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § III, at F-17, col.
2, and General Motors Corporation, Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene Is Set for a Dra-
matic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 7,
1986, at 23, col. 3.
4. Commentators have focused on the employer's interest in guaranteeing job safety
and security in the face of an increasing number of on-the-job accidents. See Lacayo,
Putting Them All To the Test, Time, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61; see also Press, First the Lie
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public employees implicates the Consitution's fourth amendment pro-
hibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures."6
Recently, several federal courts examined the constitutionality of
mandatory mass urinalysis of public sector employees.7 This Recent
Development will survey the courts' attempts to establish standards for
permissible drug testing and will examine the application of current
fourth amendment analysis.
I. URINALYSIS DEFINED
The EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique) system' is
the most prevalent test currently used to detect employee drug use.9
Detector, Then the Chemicals: Is There a Right to Privacy in the Private Sector? News-
week, Jan. 27, 1986, at 56. Other employer interests that created the perceived need for
drug testing include: absenteeism, property law, increased health insurance costs, and
increased worker's compensation claims. Husband, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the
Workplace, Labor and Employment Review, 15 COLO. LAWYER 31 (Jan. 1986). Courts
often focus on the public safety interests involved in assuring drug-free employees. See,
e.g., Division 241, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (public safety of mass transit riders outweighed privacy
interests of bus and train operators so as to allow drug testing); Allen v. City of Mari-
etta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (valid state interest in public safety of workers
engaged in extremely hazardous occupation of high-voltage wire technician justified
mandatory drug testing).
5. See infra, notes 24, 125, 147, 153 and accompanying text.
6. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment applies to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
7. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (New Jersey Ruling
Commission testing of jockeys, trainers, and grooms); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland,
647 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (urinalysis of police officers); National Fed'n of
Fed'l Empl., Local 2058 v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986) (testing of
Civilian Guard Division at military post); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986) (urinalysis of firefighters); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986) (drug testing of United States Customs work-
ers); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (urinalysis of
firefighters); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (drug testing
of power and light employees working with high voltage wires).
8. The EMIT test consists of antibodies that attach themselves to drugs or drug
metabolites (products resulting from drug breakdown in the body) in an individual's
urine sample. Syva, a Syntex Co., Frequently Asked Questions About Syva and Drug
Abuse Testing 3 (March 1983).
9. Note, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitu-
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Technicians typically administer EMIT as a preliminary drug text. t°
Designed merely to indicate the presence of drug metabolites" in a
person's body at a detectable level, 2 EMIT is incapable of measuring
the drug's concentration in the body, or indicating when the subject
took the drug. 3 Although the EMIT System detects the presence of
most drugs as long as three days after ingestion, 4 marijuana can leave
traces of tetrahydrocannabinal' 5 (THC) in the body for two to three
weeks. Other drugs such as amphetamines and secobarbitol may
pass through the body so quickly as to escape detection altogether.17
Further, EMIT fails to correlate the presence of drug metabolites to
the level of intoxication. 18 Due to shortcomings of the EMIT System,
most employers do not rely on this preliminary test to make employ-
ment decisions.' 9
tional in California? 19 LOYOLA L.A. LAW REV. 1451, 1455 (June 1986). Non-techni-
cal personnel may administer the portable EMIT test and determine results in a matter
of minutes. Svva Co., Marijuana and the EMIT Cannabinoid Assay 5 (June 1981). The
possibility of improper testing may arise when non-technical personnel implement it.
Note, supra at 1459-60.
10. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (D.D.C. 1986).
11. After the drug is in the body, the liver converts it into chemical elements called
-metabolites." Syva Co., supra note 9, at 2.
12. The 'detectable level" varies with factors such as body weight, stress, menstrual
cycle, diet, and mood, which all affect the excretion rate. Id. at 3.
13. Id.
14 Syva, a Syntex Co., supra note 8, at 4.
15, THC, tetrahydrocannabinal, is the psychoactive component of marijuana.
James v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (D.D.C. 1986).
16 Syva, a Syntex Co., supra note 8, at 2.
17. Syva Co., supra note 9, at 4.
18. It is impossible to correlate intoxication to the amount of metabolites excreted
because individual physical and psychological factors affect the rate of excretion in
urine. See supra, note 12. Thus, a person passively or actively exposed to marijuana
smoke off the job site may test positive under EMIT long after intoxication. False posi-
tives from passive inhalation have been reported. See Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests,
I DRuG. L. REP. 25 (1983). Experts indicate that marijuana intoxication occurs within
twenty to thirty minutes after smoking and lasts about two hours. Syva Report, Fre-
quently Asked Questions, supra note 8. at 1.
19. The Syva Company expressly requires a confirmation test subsequent to positive
EMIT test results. Syva Co., supra note 9 at 17; Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500,
1505 (D.D.C. 1986). Independent Toxicologists, the Center for Disease Control, and a
scientific study conducted by the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine require con-
firmation tests prior to disciplinary action. Id. at 1506.
Washington University Open Scholarship
294 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:291
Typically, employers administer a confirmation urinalysis test2"
before taking further action. The United States Government considers
the GC/MS (Gas-Chromotography/Mass Spectometry) test21 to be the
most reliable method of confirmation and drug identification.22 If a
urine sample indicates the presence of a drug,23 supervisory technicians
separate the particular drug metabolites from the individual's urine.24
Since the GC/MS test and other confirmation stage procedures involve
analysis of chemical compounds in urine, technicians can accidently
uncover physical disorders such as epilepsy and diabetes, thereby
heightening the privacy invasion. 5
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The fourth amendment requires searches and seizures to be "reason-
able.",26 Reasonableness in a particular case depends on the context of
the search.27 Generally, a "reasonable" fourth amendment search re-
quires both a warrant and probable cause. 28 A court may, however,
consider a search valid in the absence of the elements. 29 The Supreme
Court has been unable to precisely define the reasonableness of a
search.3" Instead, courts must use a case by case approach, balancing
the degree of intrusion on personal rights against the need for the par-
20. Repeating the EMIT procedure manually is an unacceptable method of confir-
mation. James v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986).
21. The test is also called "gas liquid chromatography." Id. at 1506.
22. National Fed'n of Fed'l Employees, Local 2058 v. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. 642
(D.D.C. 1986).
23. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
24. Weinberger, 640 F. Supp. at 648.
25. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986). These dis-
closures implicate the constitutional right to privacy in medical information. See itfra,
note 34.
26. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985).
27. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
28. Probable cause requires reasonable suspicion directed at the particular person to
be searched. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1979); see also United States v.
Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978). Reasonable suspicion must be specifi-
cally directed to the person to be searched and may not be "transferred" to others.
Afanador, 567 F.2d at 1331.
29. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
30. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
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ticular search.3
Traditionally, courts determine a search's intrusiveness by examin-
ing the individual's expectation of privacy.3 2 In fourth amendment
cases, courts examine whether the person has an objectively reason-
able33 subjective expectation of privacy.34
Courts exempt agency searches of participants in pervasively regu-
lated industries35 from the warrant requirement.36 This "administra-
31. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Mar-
quez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
To determine the reasonableness of a search, courts measure the degree of intrusion
against the individual's expectation of privacy. Courts generally consider inspections of
personal items the least intrusive. Searches that breach the integrity of the body create
the greatest privacy invasion. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
Schmerber involved a policeman's detection of alcohol on the defendant's breath. After
arresting the defendant, the officer directed a physician to obtain a sample of the sus-
pect's blood over the latter's objections. Id. Since the search in Schmerber involved an
intrusion beyond the body's surface, the Court held that reasonablenss depended upon
whether the officer clearly believed that he would find the incriminating evidence. Id. at
769-70.
32. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985) (indi-
viduals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information contained in
urine samples). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 367. For example, it would be unreasona-
ble for an individual to claim privacy for remarks spoken openly in public. Id. The
Court in Katz, however, held that an individual has a constitutionally reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in his conversations from a telephone booth. Id. at 359.
The Supreme Court and other federal courts recognize a right to privacy in medical
information. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (New York statute
requiring those taking certain prescription drugs to report to State Health Department
held sufficiently circumscribed to protect legitimate privacy interests). When the gov-
ernment advances a need to acquire medical information to develop treatment programs
or control public health threats, courts are more willing to uphold reporting require-
ments. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
The disclosure of personal medical information is constitutional only if society's interest
in disclosure outweighs the specific privacy interests involved. Id. Bodily fluids such as
blood and urine may contain confidential medical information. Capua v. City of Plain-
field, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986). Accord McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.
Supp. 1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985).
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (although individuals ex-
pect privacy in their home, statements, actions, or things people expose to the "plain
view" of others indicate intent to waive protection).
35. For examples of closely regulated industries in the context of administrative
searches, see Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-605 (1981) (coal mining); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-317 (1972) (gun selling); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (liquor industry); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795
F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986) (horse racing); Matter of Martin, 447 A.2d 1290, 1300
(N.J. 1982) (casino gambling).
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tive search" exception 37 contains two conditions precedent to its
application. First, the state must articulate a compelling interest in
conducting the unannounced search.38 Examples of such interests in-
clude preservation of public health and safety39 and protection of in-
dustry employees from inherent occupational hazards.4" Second, the
search must involve an industry accustomed to pervasive regulation.4
Such extensive regulation reduces an individual's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy.42 In the context of an administrative search of a highly
regulated industry, courts imply consent from participation in the
enterprise.43
Even in the context of an administrative search, the Supreme Court
applied a reasonableness standard to protect an individual's privacy
when government officials possess unlimited discretion to impose a
search.' In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 41 the Supreme Court held that
the Occupational Safety and Health Act's (OSHA)46 administrative in-
spection provisions insufficiently restricted the scope and frequency of
36. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-605 (1981). In Donovan, the Court
deferred to Congress' express findings that a warrant requirement for searches con-
ducted pursuant to the Mine Safety and Health Act would seriously frustrate enforce-
ment. Id. at 603. The Act required inspections of all mines and specifically defined the
frequency and scope of the inspections. Id. at 603-604. The Court held that the Act
provided a predictable and carefully tailored regulatory inspection scheme, Id.
37. An "administrative search" is one conducted pursuant to a statutory adminis-
trative inspection scheme. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
38. Id. at 1142. In Biswell the Court held that effective deterrence of gun sales to
undesirables, a compelling governmental interest, required warrantless searches under
the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968). Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316-317.
39. See, e.g., Biswell, 406 US. at 315-317 (warrantless searches of gun dealers re-
quired to promote federal efforts to prevent violent crime).
40. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (inspection scheme
designed to further federal interest in ameliorating health and safety in both under-
ground and surface mines).
41. Id. at 600. The Donovan Court, however, held that the regularity and pervasive-
ness of the regulation had more significance than merely its longevity. Id. at 606.
42. Id. at 600.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). In Biswell the
Court implied consent to warrantless searches and observed that the federal government
annually provides gun dealer licensees a revised compilation of gun control laws. Id.
44. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
45. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). The statute imposes health and safety standards on
all businesses engaged in or affecting interstate employees and authorizes representa-
tives of the Secretary to conduct inspections to enforce the Act. Id. at §§ 652(5), 657(a).
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searches in regulated businesses." The Court concluded that OSHA's
failure to provide detailed search standards48 gave few assurances that
the search was fair and neutral.49 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
held that the employee's privacy interests outweighed the need for sur-
prise inspections and required a warrant for OSHA searches.5 °
Recently, a few courts articulated an additional exception to the
warrant requirement in cases involving government employer searches
pertaining to an employee's job performance. In Allen v. City of Mari-
etta," a federal district court held that a city could conduct warrant-
less searches of electrical workers to determine drug use.52 Purporting
to apply a balancing test,5 3 the court concluded that a governmental
employer, like its private counterpart, has a right to supervise its em-
ployees and investigate job-related misconduct. 4 Thus, the court held
47. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 323-324 n.20-22.
48. Id. at 323-324 n.21-22.
49. Cf Donovan, 452 U.S. 594, 603-605 (1981). The Donovan Court held that the
Mine Safety and Health Act contained detailed provisions curtailing agency discretion
and delineating search procedures. Id. at 603-605. Specifically, the Act notified mine
operators of regular inspections, articulated health and safety standards, and prohibited
forcible entry. Id.
50. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978).
51 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
52. Id. at 49 1. In Allen an undercover agent working for the city observed electrical
workers smoking marijuana on the job. Id. at 484. The Electrical Distribution Superin-
tendent then allegedly correlated the names turned in by the informant with those asso-
ciated with "'unexplained" accidents on the job. Based on information from the
supervisor and the informant, Marietta's city manager tested six employees suspected of
drug use. Id. After all six tested positive for marijuana, the city terminated the employ-
ees. Id. at 484-85.
53. Id. at 491. Although the court addressed the employer's right to oversee its
employees and prevent drug abuse from curtailing the agency's ability to perform its
duties, it failed to adequately balance employee privacy concerns. Id. The court de-
emphasized the search's intrusivenss, observing that the city conducted the search in the
employment rather than the criminal context. Id. Other courts addressing this issue,
however, rejected this distinction and held that the fourth amendment protects every-
one. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (fourth amendment safe-
guards the privacy of all individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials).
See also McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (citing
Camara and recognizing the potential for future criminal investigations).
54. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491. The court concluded that a government employer
had the right to search an employee's desk or jacket to gather evidence of impropriety
related to job performance. Id. For a discussion concerning the rights of California
private employers to conduct urinalysis, see Comment, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Pri-
vate Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California? 19 LOYOLA L.A. LAW
REv. 1451 (1986).
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that a governmental employee cannot legitimately expect exemption
from searches relating to job performance. 5
Holding the city's urinalysis program constitutional in Allen, the
court relied on the fact that the city conducted tests for reasons other
than criminal investigations.56 Significantly, Allen and other cases re-
lying on the government employment exception to uphold warrantless
searches57 involved prior suspicion of individual employee's miscon-
duct.58 The Allen court recognized that although government employ-
ees work in the public sector they retain their fourth amendment
rights.59 Courts, therefore, must balance expectations and interests in
the government employment search context 60 while recognizing that
inquiries into employee misconduct have potential to become criminal
investigations.61
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
DRUG TESTING
Several federal courts recently addressed the issue of the fourth
amendment's reasonable search and seizure requirement in the context
of public employee drug testing.62 The courts in Shoemaker v. Han-
del,63 Capua v. City of Plainfield," National Treasury Employees Union
55. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491.
56. Id. For contrary authority, see supra note 53.
57. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267
(8th Cir. 1976) (blood and urinalysis tests of bus drivers directly involved in serious
accidents or suspected of drug abuse held reasonable).
58. See supra notes 52, 57. In both Allen and Suscy, the city minimized the intru-
siveness of the searches by requiring an individualized basis for the search and by limit-
ing the scope of the search. See supra notes 52, 57; cf Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986) (the city conducted urinalysis without prior individ-
ualized suspicion or general complaints of inadequate fire protection due to drug
impairment).
59. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985). See also
McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983); Cheyney State College
Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 737 (3d Cir. 1983).
60. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491; accord Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. at
1516.
61. See McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 n.2 (D. Iowa 1985)
(although primary purpose of search may be for prison security reasons, a criminal
investigation will follow the discovery of drugs or weapons).
62. This Recent Development addresses only drug testing of public employees. For
a discussion of drug urinalysis of private employees, see generally Note, supra note 9.
63. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
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v. Von Raab,6 5 and Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,6 6 balanced em-
ployee privacy concerns against the government's interest in a drug-
free workplace.6 7 Each found urinalysis to be a fourth amendment
search. 8 The Shoemaker and Von Raab courts analogized searches of
public employees to administrative searches, holding random urinalysis
reasonable in certain highly regulated and sensitive positons. 69
A. Urinalysis as a Search
In Schmerber v. California7 0 the Supreme Court held that the invol-
untary extraction of blood for a blood-alcohol test7 1 constituted a
search for fourth amendment purposes. 72 By applying fourth amend-
ment principles to bodily intrusions, the Court implied that an individ-
ual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the "information"
contained in the blood.7 3
Like blood, laboratories can analyze urine to discover physiological
64, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
65. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
66. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
67. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142-1143; Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513; Von Raab,
816 F.2d at 180; Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 879-880.
68. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142; Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175; Capua, 642 F. Supp.
at 1513; Lovworn, 647 F. Supp. at 879.
69. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142; Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 179.
70. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
71. In Schmerber, the petitioner was hospitalized after an automobile accident. At
the accident scene and later at the hospital, a police officer smelled liquor on the man's
breath and placed him under arrest. After informing the man of his rights, the officer
directed a physician to take the petitioner's blood sample over the latter's objection. Id.
at 758-59. In petitioner's trial for driving under the influence, the trial court admitted
into evidence the blood test showing intoxication. Id. at 759. Before the Supreme
Court, the petitioner argued that the officer subjected him to an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Id.
72. Id. at 767. In holding the fourth amendment applicable to involuntary extrac-
tions of blood, the Court relied on the amendment's explicit provision protecting an
individual's right to be secure in his or her person. Id.
73. Id. at 769-70. Invoking an individual's interests in privacy and dignity, the
Court held that a police officer must have probable cause and a belief in the likely
success of a blood-alcohol test before he or she can require a search. Id. at 770. In the
blood-alcohol context, the information contained in the blood is potential evidence of
the person's guilt or innocence. Id. Absent probable cause to search the individual in
this manner, the person's privacy interests would outweigh the need for an immediate
search. Id. The Schmerber Court found the particular search in question reasonable
because medical personnel in a hospital performed it following the police officer's rea-
sonable suspicion of the petitioner's intoxication. Id. at 771-72.
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information, including the recent use of alcohol or drugs.74 In McDon-
nell v. Hunter75 the federal district court, relying on Schmerber,76
found that the taking of a urine sample by a government official is a
search and seizure within the fourth amendment.77 Unlike blood,
urine is routinely discharged, requiring no bodily intrusion for its
seizure.78 Yet, the McDonnell court found that an individual normally
discharges urine under circumstances indicating a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 79 Therefore, the court held that an individual's inter-
ests in safeguarding the personal information contained in a urine
sample8" are sufficiently important to merit fourth amendment protec-
tion from arbitrary interference.81
B. Shoemaker v. Handel-Administrative Search Exception Applied
to Mass Urinalysis
In Shoemaker v. Handel,82 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals up-
74. McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985); see supra notes
8-21 and accompanying text.
75. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Iowa 1985).
76. Id. at 1127, citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
77. McDonnell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127, citing Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214,
1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
In Storms, prison officials conducted random urinalysis of prisoners for marijuana
and narcotics. Id. at 1216. The Storms court found urinalysis analogous to the blood
testing in Schmerber because both involved the involuntary taking of bodily fluids. Id.
at 1218. Since urinalysis involves an intrusion into the body, the court found it more
intrusive than traditional searches. Id. at 1218. Finding urination in the presence of
prison officials even more intrusive and degrading than blood tests, the Storms court
held that urinalysis should receive the same level of scrutiny as blood testing. Id.
Therefore, the court required a clear indication of drug usage before government offi-
cials could perform urinalysis. Id. However, the Storms court held that the "clear
indication" requirement did not apply to prisoners because of the special security needs
of penitentiaries. Id. The court held that the mere likelihood of finding drugs was
sufficient to support a finding of cause given an inmate's limited constitutional rights.
Id. Since prison inmates have a lower expectation of privacy than the general popula-
tion, the Storms court explicitly restricted its holding to prisoners. Those not incarcer-
ated, however, can legitimately expect a higher showing of cause before state officials
can perform urinalysis. Id.
78. McDonnell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127.
79. Id. The court concluded that only pursuant to a medical examination does one
reasonably expect to donate urine for chemical analysis. Id.
80. See supra note 34, and accompanying text for discussion of an individual's right
to privacy in personal medical information.
81. McDonnell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127.
82. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
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held a breath and urine testing program for horse racing jockeys, train-
ers, and grooms.83 The New Jersey Racing Commission84 required
drug testing of horse racing employees to preserve the appearance of
integrity in the sport.8" The Shoemaker court found that New Jersey
had a valid interest in maintaining public confidence in the industry86
because the state received substantial revenue from horse racing.87
Challenging the drug testing program in Shoemaker, the jockeys ar-
gued that absent individualized suspicion of drug use, random urinal-
ysis and warrantless production of breath samples violated the fourth
amendment.88 The Racing Commission conceded that the mandatory
tests involved a search and seizure,89 but contended that the searches
were reasonable because the employees voluntarily participated in a
highly regulated industry.'
Addressing the fourth amendment claim,9 the Shoemaker court rec-
83. Pursuant to a New Jersey Racing Commission regulation, N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13, §§ 70-14A.1 to 14A.11 (1985), the Commission required jockeys to submit to
random daily blood-alcohol and urinalysis. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1139-1140. The
regulation prohibited the use of controlled substances regardless of whether the drug
use occurred during work hours. Id. at 1140-41.
84. The Racing Commission regulates horse racing in New Jersey. Its powers in-
clude promulgating rules and regulations for the industry. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-30
(West 1973).
85. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138. In an effort to promote the appearance of integ-
rity, the Commission required horse trainers to prevent persons from administering
drugs altering the animal's performance. Commission regulations require post-race
drug testing of horses and also allow warrantless searches of stables. N.J. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 70-14A.1 to 70-14A.11 (1985).
86. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142.
87. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:5-64, 5:5-64.1 (West Supp. 1985). The court found that
the vulnerability of horse racing to criminal influence bolstered the state's need to up-
hold the industry's appearance of integrity. 795 F.2d at 1141. State statutes also pro-
hibit racetracks from hiring individuals convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-34 (1985).
88, 795 F.2d at 1141. The jockeys further argued that the drug testing regulation
vested too much discretion in commission officials. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text for discussion of "administra-
tive search exception."
91. The jockeys also claimed violations of equal protection and the right to privacy
of medical information. Id. at 1143-1144. The court held that case law limited to confi-
dentiality concerns any separate cause of action based on penumbral constitutional
rights to privacy. Id. at 1144, citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) and
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); see supra
note 34 for discussion of the right to privacy in medical information. Since the Racing
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ognized that the New Jersey horse racing industry is closely regu-
lated.92 Next, the court addressed the question whether the
administrative search exception applied to warrantless drug testing of
persons engaged in a pervasively regulated occupation.93 The court
examined the requirements for applying this exception. First, a strong
state interest must exist for conducting a search.94 Second, the subjects
of the search must have a reduced expectation of personal privacy from
pervasive regulation of the industry. 95 The court found both of these
requirements satisfied 96 and accepted the state's interest in maintaining
public confidence in horse racing.97 Noting the existence of Racing
Commission regulations permitting searches of stables to find evidence
of horse drugging,98 the court found horse racing employees had a re-
duced expectation of privacy on the job.99
Although the drug testing of jockeys was within the administrative
search exception,"° the Shoemaker court recognized that the search
must also withstand a reasonableness test.1 In assessing the jockeys'
claim that the testing was arbitrary, 1 2 the court held that the adminis-
Commission promulgated confidentiality regulations when the action was pending, the
Shoemaker court held the privacy cause of action not ripe for review. 795 F.2d at 1144.
92. Id. at 1142. For a discussion of other cases holding an industry "closely regu-
lated" for purposes of the "administrative search exception," see supra notes 35-43 and
accompanying text.
93. 795 F.2d at 1142. The court acknowledged that previous "administrative
search" exception cases involved searches of premises rather than persons. Id. Gener-
ally, courts apply a higher level of scrutiny to searches involving bodily intrusions be-
cause of a greater expectation of privacy. See supra note 31. The Shoemaker court
concluded, however, that because the chief regulatory concerns involved persons en-
gaged in horse racing, the distinction did not make the testing unreasonable. 795 F.2d
at 1142.
94. Id. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for examples of compelling
state interests justifying the application of the "administrative search" exception.
95. 795 F.2d at 1142. See supra notes 33, 34, 42, 43 for discussion of an individual's
expectation of privacy for fourth admendment purposes.
96. 795 F.2d at 1142.
97. Id. The court found periodic drug testing to be the most effective way to
demonstrate the industry's integrity and autonomy to the public. Id. at 1142, 1143.
98. See supra note 85.
99. 795 F.2d at 1142. The court further observed that, unlike other cases involving
warrantless searches, the Racing Commission warned the jockeys of drug testing after a
specified date. Id.
100. Id. at 1142-43.
101. Id. at 1143.
102. Id. The jockeys argued that the regulation vested standardless discretion in
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trative regulations sufficiently limited the Racing Commission's discre-
tion in conducting the searches.10 3  In contrast with the OSHA
regulations in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,"° the Racing Commission
regulations vested no discretion in the state field testing officer10 5 to
conduct the tests and choose the subjects. 106 In sum, the court found
the testing reasonable in Shoemaker because it protected the jockeys
from arbitrary, standardless intrusions into their privacy."0 7
Significantly, Shoemaker is the first federal circuit court decision on
testing officers and therefore (following Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978),
discussed supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text) should be invalidated. 795 F.2d at
1143.
103. Id. at 1143.
104. See supra note 46.
105. The names of all jockeys participating in a particular race are placed in an
envelope. The state field testing officer then draws the names of three to five jockeys for
drug testing. 795 F.2d at 1143. If the officer draws a jockey's name more than three
times in one week, he disregards the choice and draws another name. Id. After their
last race of the day, the selected jockeys must fill out a form listing all prescription or
non-prescription drugs recently taken. Then, the jockeys must provide a urine sample
for testing. Id. The Racing Commission may use test results only in an administrative
or judicial ruling following a hearing. Id. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-14A.11(e)
(1985).
106. Id. at 1143. The Shoemaker court held that the lottery system employed by
the Racing Commission effectively eliminated the opportunity for the officers to make
arbitrary or biased selections. Approving random selection for testing, the court cited
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 564-66 (1976) (holding constitutional a
random search at a border check-point selected by law enforcement officials). Id. The
Shoemaker court declined to follow the reasoning in Security and Law Enforcement
Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1984) in which the court
held unconstitutional random strip and body cavity searches of prison employees for
contraband. 795 F.2d at 1143 n.7. But cf Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214,
(S.D. N.Y. 1984), in which the court held constitutional random urinalysis of prisoners.
The Shoemaker court limited its holding to random searches of voluntary participants
in a highly regulated industry. 795 F.2d at 1143, n.7. The implied consent to warrant-
less searches by participants in a regulated industry is analogous to random searches of
prisoners. In both contexts, the subjects have a reduced expectation of privacy. See
supra notes 43 and 77. Therefore, the constitutionality of random selection of urinalysis
subjects through lottery without prior suspicion of drug use may be limited to situations
in which the subject's expectation of privacy is limited. Cf Committee for G.I. Rights
v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975) in which the court held that the armed
forces could subject personnel to warrantless drug testing. Members of the armed
forces have a significantly lower expectation of privacy because they are subjected to
frequent mandatory inspections. Id. at 477. See also Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,
647 F. Supp. 875, 882 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (distinguishing firefighters' privacy expecta-
tions from soldiers').
107. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143.
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the constitutionality of public sector drug testing.10 8 Further, Shoe-
maker is the first application of the administrative search exception in
the drug testing context.'0 9
C. Capua v. City of Plainfield
In Capua v. City of Plainfield10 the federal district court for New
Jersey struck down a random and unannounced mandatory drug test-
ing program directed at firefighters.111 Plainfield's city agents adminis-
tered a urinalysis program without notice" 2 and without the guidance
of regulation or directive. 113 The city failed to provide either a written
basis for the testing,114 or procedures for collecting, testing, and utiliz-
ing the information.' 15 The city immediately terminated sixteen
firefighters whose tests indicated the presence of a controlled sub-
108. The city appealed the ruling in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986) holding unconstitutional urinalysis of firefighters. See Shipp, Can Drug
Testing Coexist with Fourth Amendment? St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1986, § B,
at 1, col. 1.
109. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text. With the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in national Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987),
an additional circuit has elaborated on the application of the administrative search ex-
ception analogy regarding urinalysis of public employees. See infra text accompanying
notes 139-160.
110. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
111. Id. at 1522.
112. The city required each fire department employee to urinate under the surveil-
lance and supervision of bonded testing agents. Id. at 1511. None of the 103 firefighters
tested received prior notice of sub-standard job performance or were under investigation
for drug use. Id. at 1516. The city failed to provide written procedures for collecting,
testing and utilizing the information gathered. The city also failed to inform the termi-
nated employees of the particular substance found in their samples. Id. at 1511-12.
113. Cf Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), supra notes 83, 105
and accompanying text.
114. 643 F. Supp. at 1511. The collective bargaining agreement between the
firefighters and the city failed to provide for urinalysis. Id. The lack of written regula-
tions mandating drug testing is relevant to the firefighters' legitimate expectation of
privacy. In Shoemaker, the existence of extensive prior regulation of the horse racing
industry lowered the jockeys' expectations of privacy so as to permit warrantless drug
testing.
115. The lack of procedural safeguards triggered procedural due process concerns.
643 F. Supp. at 1521. Since the court subsequently held that the city lacked just cause
to terminate the firefighters, their discharge violated fourteenth amendment due process
rights. Id. at 1521-22. The court found that requiring urinalysis under the threat of
termination coerced a waiver of the rights against self-incrimination found in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Id. at 1521.
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stance'' 6 and charged them with "commission of a criminal act."' 17
The court found that urinalysis constituted a search and seizure
under the fourth amendment,1 8 and then examined the reasonableness
of the testing."' The court balanced Plainfield's valid concern with
eradicating drug use' 20 against the degree of intrusion engendered by
the search. 121
By examining the firefighters' privacy interests, 122 the court initially
assessed the degree of intrusion. Recognizing that urination is tradi-
tionally a private function,' 23 the court noted that most municipalities
prohibit the act in public.' 24  Like strip search exposure, the court
found surveillance of employee urination highly intrusive,'12 regardless
of how professionally and courteously conducted. 26 Furthermore, the
court held that compulsory urinalysis forces subjects to divulge private
medical information unrelated to drug abuse on the job. 12 7
The court addressed the application of the "administrative search
exception" to Plainfield's urinalysis program. 12 8 Distinguishing Shoe-
116. Id. at 1512. The city failed to provide a confirmation test to corroborate the
initial test results. Id. at 1521. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text discussing
the necessity of confirmation tests.
117. 643 F. Supp. at 1512. The court held that the ten day delay before issuing the
complaints and the failure of the complaints to mention hearing procedures contributed
to the procedural due process violation. Id. at 1521.
118. Id. at 1513.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1514.
121. Id. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for fourth amendment balancing
test.
122. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
123. Id. The court noted that both private and public restroom facilities account
for the private nature of urination. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. In Shoemaker v. Handel, by contrast, the district court concluded that
urinalysis was less intrusive than either blood testing or body cavity and strip searches.
608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). Unlike the city in
Capua, the Racing Commission did not impose surveillance on jockeys while they uri-
nated. See supra note 105.
126. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514.
127 Id. at 1515. The court held that the government failed to advance a counter-
vailing legitimate need for plaintiffs' personal medical data. Id. See supra note 34 for
discussion of right to privacy in personal medical information. Rather than insuring the
confidentiality of the urinalysis results, the city publicized its actions in the news media.
Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1515.
128. Id. at 1515, 1518. The court quickly distinguished employment search excep-
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maker v. Handel, the court held that the regulation of firefighting, un-
like horse racing, is not so intense as to diminish the firefighters'
legitimate expectations of privacy. 129  The court emphasized that
neither the initial employment agreement with the city nor any civil
service requirement called for drug testing. 130
The Capua court further distinguished Shoemaker on the ground
that the state's interest in horse racing justified mass urinalysis more
readily than the city's interests in Capua.'3  The Shoemaker court
based its decision on the state's interest in upholding the perception of
integrity in the racing industry in the face of public suspicion of crimi-
nal influences.13 2 The Plainfield firefighters' job performance, on the
other hand, did not depend upon the public's perception of their integ-
rity. 133 After ruling that the city's determination of job capability did
not require mandatory urinalysis, 134 the court stated that the individu-
alized suspicion standard was the only safe, constitutional manner of
protecting governmental interests. 135
The Capua court found individualized suspicion absent and held
Plainfield's drug testing program unconstituitionally overinclusive. 136
The court permanently enjoined the city from further urine testing,
tion cases such as Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), supra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text, and Division 24, Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1976), supra notes 57-58, recognizing that they involved
prior reasonable suspicion of drug use.
129. 643 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
130. Id. at 1519. Therefore, the court concluded that the Plainfield firefighters en-
joyed more privacy on the job than did race horse jockeys. Id.
131. Id. at 1519. The mass urinalysis in Shoemaker permitted the Racing Commis-
sion to uphold the industry's integrity against public scrutiny. See supra notes 87, 97
and accompanying text. In Capua, the publication of the test results in the media
caused public suspicion and degradation. 643 F. Supp. at 1519.
132. See supra note 87.
133. The Capua court concluded that the Plainfield firefighters, unlike jockeys, can
perform their jobs effectively when faced with unfavorable public opinion. 643 F. Supp.
at 1519.
134. The court found that the city's screening test for applicants and extensive fire
fighting training ensured job capability. Id.
135. Id. at 1520.
136. Id. The court further distinguished Shoemaker v. Handel. In Capua, the lack
of procedural safeguards created a greater potential for criminal prosecution. Id This
increased risk of criminal prosecution for drug use subjected the firefighters to a greater
degree of intrusion from the urinalysis. In Shoemaker, the jockeys obtained a specific
agreement to keep test results confidential from law enforcement agents. Shoemaker v.
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d Cir. 1946).
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ordered the immediate reinstatement of the suspended firefighters,
137
and approved the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against city
officials. 138
D. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 139 the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered the constitutionality of mandatory urinalysis as a con-
dition of promotion to certain positions with the United States
Customs Service. " Under the Customs program, employees who
tested positive through drug screening 14 1 could not be considered for
promotion and faced possible termination. 142 The Service also refused
to promote employees who refused to submit to the test. 1
43
Addressing whether the fourth amendment applied to urinalysis, 1"
the Von Raab court held that urinalysis constitutes a search and
seizure.145 The court found that because urinalysis infringes on an em-
ployee's right to privacy, the test is a "search." 146 This expectation of
137. 643 F. Supp. at 1522.
138. Id.
139. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit vacated a stay granted by the
district court. See 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986).
140. 649 F. Supp. at 382. The court did not specify the nature of the "covered
positions" within the Customs Service.
141. Pursuant to the drug testing scheme, the Customs Service first required sub-
jects to fill out a pre-test form describing medications taken within the last thirty days
and any contact with illegal drugs within that time. Next, the agency required employ-
ees to urinate into a sample jar while under the direct observation of a laboratory repre-
sentative standing behind a partition. Id. The laboratory technician was able to observe
subjects from the shoulder up. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The key inquiry involves whether urinalysis constitutes a search for fourth
amendment purposes. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
145. 816 F.2d at 175.
146. Id. at 175. See also the district court's opinion stating that drug testing is a
full-scale search of the person, and thus more intrusive than pat-down searches or
searches of the home. 649 F. Supp. at 386. Courts addressing "pat-down" or "frisk"
searches in the Customs context applied a lesser standard for justification. In United
States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held that Customs workers
could conduct frisk searches of individuals crossing the border without any justification.
Id. at 1169. The court specifically limited its holding to pat-down searches, refusing to
address more intrusive searches, such as those involving breaches of the body's surface.
Id. The Sandier court believed that as the intrusiveness of the search increases so does
the justification required for the search. Id. at 1166, citing United States v. Afanador,
567 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1978). Courts traditionally require at least reasonable
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privacy is unimpaired by the fact that a person chooses to use a public
facility, and is evidenced by the prohibition of public urination. 147 In
addition, the court emphasized that urinalysis reveals more personal
information than mere illicit drug use. 148 Giving ajar of bodily wastes
to Customs officials, according to the court, constituted a seizure for
fourth amendment purposes.
149
After determining that the fourth amendment applies to Customs
Service testing, the court considered the reasonableness of the
search. 5 ° The court balanced the need for the search against the in-
fringement of the employee's privacy.151 Ultimately, the court found
the government's interest stronger and vacated the stay granted by the
district court in favor of the employees.152
Examining the scope and manner of the search, the court stated that
since only employees seeking promotion to sensitive positions are sub-
ject to urinalysis and since the test results are not discretionary, the
program's scope is limnited enough to be "reasonable" under the fourth
amendment.' 53 The court found that the service could justify its pro-
gram because the agency had a "strong interest" in ensuring the effec-
tive operation of employees in potentially sensitive job positions.15 4
The court found that the test is consensual to a small degree since only
those employees seeking advancement are subject to the test.' 55
The Fifth Circuit examined the nature of federal employment, find-
ing that, within limits, government employees may be subject to re-
straints that would be impermissible absent the employment
relationship."5 6 The fact that the search is required for an administra-
suspicion to justify strip searches. See United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d
Cir. 1978).
147. 816 F.2d at 175.
148. Id. at 176.
149. Id. at 176.
150. Id. at 176-82.
151. Id. at 176 citing O'Connor v. Ortega, - US -, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1500 (1987).
152. Id. at 182.
153. Id. at 177. The court stated that urinalysis is less intrusive than an invasion of
"bodily integrity" of the home, or than strip or body cavity searches. Id.
154. Id. at 178. The court found that drug use by the Service would seriously un-
dermine the agency's reputation and ability to conduct its work. Id.
155. Id. The court also found that "[tihe place in which the search is conducted, a
restroom, is the most private facility practicable." Id.
156. Id. at 178-79. As long as the search is a "reasonable condition of employ-
ment," it is an appropriate condition of employment. Id. at 179.
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tive purpose is acceptable if the government demonstrates a need for
the testing to preserve the service's reputation.
1 57
The court stated that although this is not a highly regulated indus-
try, it would employ the balancing test used in those industries. 58 The
court further found that urinalysis is an effective means of determining
if an employee is a drug addict.15 9 Thus, the court vacated the district
court's stay and allowed the drug screening program to continue.160
E. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,6 ' the court considered a consti-
tutional challenge to a mandatory urinalysis program of city firefight-
ers.' 6 2  Fire department officials in Lovvorn lacked individualized
suspicion of drug use among firefighters. 163 The fire commissioner,
upon hearing rumors that firefighters taking an earlier drug test'6 4
switched urine samples, retested the entire department.1
65
As in Capua, the Chattanooga fire commissioner instituted the mass
urinalysis without published or uniform standards and testing proce-
dures.' 6 6 Although the commissioner performed a GC/MS confirma-
157. Id.
158. Id. at 179-80.
159. Id. at 180-81. In addition, the court found that there are no less intrusive
measures available to reach the same end. Id. at 180.
160. Id. at 182. The court also briefly addressed due process and quality assurance
issues. Id. at 181-82.
161. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
162. Id. at 879. In 1984 the Chattanooga fire and police commissioner administered
the urine tests after supervisors found "civilian" employees smoking marijuana. In
early 1985 the fire chief sent notice to all firefighters directing them to report to an
independent laboratory for blood and urine testing. The urinalysis consisted of urina-
tion under direct observation of an assistant fire chief followed by EMIT testing. Id. at
877. Without conducting a confirmation test other than a follow-up EMIT test, the
department suspended several firefighters and released their names to the press. Id. at
878. The fire department failed to provide written guidelines regarding testing proce-
dure, standards for disciplinary action, and confidentiality of test results. Id. at 878-79.
After the department completed its initial testing and fired ten employees, it performed
confirmation tests on the samples. Id. See supra notes 20-24 for discussion of the
GC/MS confirmation test.
163. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 878.
164. See supra note 166.
165. 647 F. Supp. at 878. This proposed retesting of the entire department is the
subject of the lawsuit.
166. The department decided that a "positive" test result for the 1985 testing was
100 nanograms of cannabinoids per milliliter with "trace" (50 to 100 ng/ml) and "mi-
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tion test during the 1985 testing, 167 it was unclear whether the
proposed new tests would include this vital secondary procedure. 168
After the parties stipulated that the urinalysis constituted a search
and seizure, 169 the court examined the reasonableness of the test.
170
Following the approach taken in Capua and Von Raab, the court bal-
anced the need for the search against the intrusion of privacy.' 7 ' The
court recognized the city's compelling interest in a drug-free work
force, arising from fire fighting's hazardous nature' 72 and the need for
quick thinking.'73 Next, the court addressed the degree of the test's
intrusiveness.' 74 Finding that forced urination under the direct obser-
vation of city agents would offend some firefighters, 175 the court held
that urinalysis interferes with the firefighters' subjective expectation of
privacy. 176 The court, however, held that observation of the donation
does not by itself make the urinalysis unconstitutional. 177
The court next considered whether the firefighters' expectation of
nus trace" (20-50 ng/ml) categories. The fire department retested all those testing at
"minus trace" or above. Id. In the proposed new tests, the Commissioner suggested
the 50 ng/ml as a benchmark for passing or failing. Id. at 879. The department failed
to write down the standards. Id.
167. See supra note 165.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 878-80.
171. Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
172. 647 F. Supp. at 879, cf hazardous electric power work in Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
173. 647 F. Supp. at 879. The court recognized that firefighters must make quick
decisions and remember the location of hydrants and hazardous chemicals. The court
accepted expert testimony demonstrating that marijuana can diminish short-term mem-
ory, perception, and motor-skills. Id.
174. Id. at 880.
175. Id. The court concluded that the degree of intrusion caused by urinalysis va-
ried significantly among different individuals. Id. The city argued that because the
firefighters typically shared restroom facilities, lived together and routinely undressed in
each other's presence, urination under observation of someone of the same sex was
unoffensive. Id. Nevertheless, the court found that some of the firefighters would be
offended. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at n.5. Since the city demonstrated that it had no less intrusive means of
conducting effective urinalysis, direct observation of urination alone was constitutional.
Id. The court's conclusions regarding the intrusiveness of direct observation of urina-
tion are contrary to those in Capua. See Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514; But compare Von
Raab, 649 F. Supp. at 387 ("close" not direct, observation found less intrusive than
strip or body cavity searches). Similarly, the Van Raab court found that the bathroom
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privacy was reasonable under the circumstances. 178 Although the
court acknowledged that firefighters, as city employees engaged in a
hazardous activity, have a somewhat diminished privacy expecta-
tion, 179 it nevertheless required individualized suspicion prior to
mandatory urinalysis.' In defense, the city urged the court to follow
Shoemaker and create an exception to the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard announced in Capua, Von Raab, and McDonnell."' The court
rejected the administrative search analogy and held that Chattanooga's
plan lacked the substantive and procedural safeguards present in Shoe-
maker.'8 2 The court also found that firefighting was not a pervasively
regulated industry. Thus, the city's plan was a victim of the standar-
dless discretion denounced in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 183
Next, the city analogized the case to those cases upholding drug test-
ing in the armed forces.' 4 The court held the "military exception" to
the reasonable suspicion standard inapplicable,18 5 reasoning that the
military instituted drug testing following an increased incidence of
drug abuse which created a significant threat to national security.' 86
In addition, the court observed that, unlike firefighters, the military
immediately subjects soldiers to strict military inspection.1
8 7
The Lovvorn court delineated requirements for a valid drug testing
program."18 The city must obtain a reasonable individualized suspi-
cion of drug use from observation of inadequate job performance or
physical or mental deficiencies. "' The court suggested that the fire
department could implement personnel procedures to uncover drug
in which "close" observation occurred was the most private facility practicable. Von
Raab, 816 F.2d at 178.
178. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 880.
179. Id., citing Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
180. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 880.
181. Id. at 881.
182. Id.
183. Id. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
184. 647 F. Supp. at 882. See, e.g., Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518
F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
185. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 882.
186. Callaway, 518 F.2d at 476.
187. Id. at 477. In this respect, military service is analogous to participation in a
highly regulated industry. See supra note 106.
188. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883.
189. Id. Cf Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986)
(requiring manifestation of outward symptoms of drug use).
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abuse symptoms such as absenteeism, irregular conduct, and financial
problems.19 Finally, the court held that the testing must be narrowly
tailored and as unintrusive as feasible.191
Finding reasonable suspicion of drug use entirely absent in Lovvorn,
the court enjoined Chattanooga from implementing drug testing of
firefighters except in accordance with the court's opinion.192
IV. CONCLUSION
The Capua, Shoemaker, Von Raab, and Lovvorn cases, together pro-
vide guidance regarding constitutionally permissible drug testing pro-
grams. First, if the industry is highly regulated,1 93 the administrative
search exception may permit mass drug testing without individualized
suspicion if instituted pursuant to a detailed, published regulatory
scheme.1 94 An analogy to warrantless armed services drug testing may
fail because extensive government supervision significantly reduces the
privacy expectations of military personnel.195 Even with a highly regu-
lated industry, the state has a strong interest to support mandatory
drug testing. 196
In cases not involving a pervasively regulated industry, case law in-
structs that reasonable, individualized suspicion of drug use is a mini-
mum requirement.' 97 Even with particularized suspicion, drug testing
schemes must provide reasonable procedures for collection, 198 test-
ing,199 utilization of results,2°" and confidentiality of personal medical
190. 647 F. Supp. at 883.
191. Id. The court held testing of the entire fire department after learning of the
substituted urine samples of only fifteen firefighters impermissible. Id.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
194. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986).
195. See supra notes 106, 192 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986).
198. See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1140. Although direct observation of urine dona-
tion is essential for proper test administration, the Capua court found it highly intru-
sive. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514. But cf supra note 182. It is unclear, therefore,
whether courts would hold un-observed urine collection the only reasonable collection
method. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
199. Courts will probably require some confirmation testing methods, such as
GC/MS, to uphold a drug testing plan. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F.
Supp. 875, 878-79 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
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information received.2 ° '
As a result of the growing number of cases striking down drug test-
ing of public employees, 20 2 government employers should pursue the
issue at the bargaining table rather than in court.20 3 Although surprise
testing has advantages, 2° the recent cases require particularized stan-
dards embodied in administrative regulations or a collective bargaining
agreement.2 o5
The requirements enunciated in the federal cases from Shoemaker to
Lovvorn will prove burdensome to the federal government in light of its
current plan for widespread drug testing of federal employees. By ex-
ecutive order,206 President Reagan called for mandatory testing of em-
ployees in "sensitive positions.' , 2° 7 The order apparently allows agency
executives to implement drug testing without individualized suspicion
of drug use.20 8 Further, the order allows the administrators considera-
ble discretion in determining the criteria and scope of such testing.
209
To its credit, the executive order contains guidelines for proper notice
of testing, 210 custodial safeguards, 21 '1 and mandatory confirmation
tests.2 2 In addition, the order requires that urine donation procedures
200 The testing agency must proceed pursuant to detailed, written procedures re-
garding test results leading to termination. See Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 883. The
absence of written guidelines may lead to invalidation on procedural due process
grounds. Id.
201. See Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1515. The confidentiality guidelines contained in
the New Jersey Racing Commission regulations may provide adequate protection for
these concerns. See supra note 105; and Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138 n.2.
202. Capua, Von Raab, and Lovvorn, holding mandatory mass urinalysis unconsti-
tutional, were decided in the last four months of 1986.
203. Drug testing contained in a collective bargaining agreement would provide the
necessary guidelines for proper testing procedures, would apprise employees of grounds
for termination, and would provide an avenue for dispute resolution.
204 See, e~g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. at 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
205. Id.
206. Exec. Order No. 12564, reprinted in 55 U.S.L.W. 2177 (Sept. 30, 1986).
207. Exec. Order No. 12564. The order leaves "sensitive positions" undefined.
208. Id. at § 3.
209. Id. The order also appears to allow agency heads to conduct both voluntary
drug testing and urinalysis based on reasonable suspicion of drug use. Id. The agency
head must base his decision on considerations of the agency's duties, public health and
safety concerns, and national security. Id.
210. Id. at § 4. The order provides sixty days notice prior to implementation of a
plan. § 4(a).
211. Id. at 2178, §4(c).
212. Id. at § 5(e).
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respect individual privacy.2
13
To the extent that the president's plan allows urinalysis without rea-
sonable suspicion of drug use, its constitutionality is suspect.2 14 The
order may also grant excessive discretion to agency officials regarding
the scope and frequency of the tests.215 Such a finding would defeat
the use of the administrative search exception to the probable cause
requirement. 216 Regardless of the outcome, the executive order is
likely to be the subject of considerable future litigation.21 7
The reasonable suspicion requirement will result in greater adminis-
trative costs in monitoring employee behavior, 18 and decreased suc-
cess in the "war on drugs. 2 19 Yet, as the Capua court admonished,22 °
society should not disregard the constitutional rights of the innocent to
discover the guilty.
2 2 1
Russell Buhite*
213. Id. at § 4(c).
214. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
216. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d Cir. 1986).
217. The testing of customs employees in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), may be an example of government testing of
"sensitive position" employment. See supra note 144.
218. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text for personnel procedures aimed
at detecting drug abuse on the job.
219. In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), the
court observed that even mass urine testing does not guarantee that drug users will not
escape detection and pose safety problems. Id. at 883.
220. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp, 1507, 1522 (D.N.J. 1986).
221. Although the Capua court concluded that education and treatment were im-
portant weapons in the war on drugs, it stated that even reduced drug use fails to justify
infringements on constitutional rights. Id. at 1522.
* J.D. 1987, Washington University.
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